Update: Prigozhin might be right about Ukrainian troops in Robotyne.
There hasn’t been a huge amount of movement on the Southern Front unless the bombshell that Prigozhin and Girkin just dropped on Telegram a few hours ago proves true. I’m going to preface this by saying I am viewing this claim with an extreme amount of skepticism, but given Ukrainian OPSEC (operational security—not talking about the offensive) creating a bit of an informational vacuum, it’s hard to judge on its face what’s true and what’s not
In a four-minute rant, Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin accuses the Russian Ministry of Defense of covering up Ukrainian gains, and that Ukraine has already occupied (liberated) Urozhaine, has entered Robotyne, and that forward elements of Ukraine have already reached Sadove.
Prigozhin claims that there are areas of the front where reporters (presumably meaning military bloggers) are neither permitted to go nor from which to report accurate/unofficial information.
There are two primary offensives by the Ukrainian army in the southern theater. An offensive aimed at Tokmak, and an offensive that drove south from the town of Velyka Novosilka.
From geolocated Russian losses, from other reporting of the front from Russian Telegram sources, from pro-Ukrainian aggregators like Andrew Perpetua, Poulet Volant, or Ukraine Control Map are in general agreement that Ukraine’s attacks remain a few km north of Robotyne, and the main push by Ukraine’s most elite units appear to be to the northeast of Robotyne.
In this more sober view of events, the elite NATO-equipped 47th and 33rd Mechanized Brigades (MB) continue to work methodically southward. There is reported fighting east of Balka Uspenivska nature reserve. The inexperienced 65th MB continues to work its way south on a more direct route.
Ukraine would be about 2km north of Russia’s first of four main defense lines that bracket the city of Robotyne, Ukraine’s first major objective in this area. From what we’ve seen and heard, this version of events seems fairly reasonable.
Prigozhin’s claims are… something else entirely for this area. Prigozhin opens by claiming that Piatkhatky was captured by Ukraine—a very uncontroversial claim that Ukrainian sources have largely verified. But then Prigozhin claims Ukrainian forces are already in the northern part of Robotyne. This would be great news, if true, because it would mean Ukraine has already breached and compromised the first Russian defense line. But it gets way crazier a sentence later.
Because Prigozhin then claims Ukrainian troops are in the village of Sadove. That’s 20 km southeast of Robotyne, and just north of the rail hub of Tokmak. To get troops there, Ukraine would somehow need to be able to move soldiers past about three lines of Russian defenses.
I could maybe be talked into believing Ukraine is much closer to Robotyne than we are led to believe. I’ll begin calling local butchers about where I can find crow if Prigozhin is right about Sadove—Ukrainian troops are not in Sadove. The fact he even makes such an outrageous claim makes me think pretty much everything in this rant is likely to be highly suspect.
in the Velyka Novosilka front, there are reports that the Ukrainian 4th Tank Brigade and the 37th Marines are making progress east of Urozhaine and that Ukraine’s two inexperienced 23rd MB and 31st MB have been committed to attacks on the left flank and appear to be pinching the remaining salient of Russian troops defending Rivnopil.
Here too, a sober reading of events would have Ukraine keeping its elite heavy armored brigades (in white text) largely in reserve, letting its elite light infantry (Marines, Jaeger) and new trainees with Soviet arms (23rd MB and 31st MB) lead the fighting.
Ukraine would still be about 10km from the main line of Russian defenses, and slowly pressing back Russian defenses from the flanks, avoiding costly frontal assaults on occupied villages.
Prigozhin says Ukraine’s already captured Urozhaine, which would put Ukrainian troops only a few km away from its likely primary initial objective of Staromlynivka. Which would be great, except given how much BS Prigozhin heaped on this claim
The idea that Ukraine already capture Urozhaine is far less fantastical than the idea that Ukraine could have troops wandering around Sadove village. Nonetheless, this has been a closely watched area of the front. No images of fighting by Ukrainian troops south of Urozhaine have emerged, and by all indications, the battle for Urozhaine remains ongoing.
So I will categorize Prigozhin’s claims in the “probably BS” category, but something to watch for further developments.
Today, the United States Department of Defense announced a $1.2B contract with RTX (formerly Raytheon) to purchase AIM120 AMRAAM C8 and D3 air-to-air missiles. 39% of the contract (approx. $450M) will be for the benefit of 18 U.S. allies, including Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, Finland, and others.
The announcement did not specify how much of the $450M purchase for allies would be committed to Ukraine, or whether that would include the most advanced AMRAAM D3 missile. Ukraine has already received shipments of the AMRAAM C8 missile for use in the NASAMS anti-air battery, but not the AMRAAM D3.
I wrote an article a while back focusing on the interplay of the MIg-31 and the F-16, but it was built around a couple of assumptions that have not panned out. Some developments have been very good compared to my assumptions, and some have been disappointing. But with F-16s (hopefully) three months away or less, a clearer picture of what we can expect when the F-16s hit the field has begun to emerge.
- I thought once discussions of sending F-16s got serious, it might lead to a discussion of sending E-3 Sentry AWACS to Ukraine. There are numerous E-3 Sentries set to be retired or sold in the US and UK, to be replaced by the E-7 Wedgetail in the next few years.
- Disappointingly, so far there hasn’t been so much as a rumor of anyone considering giving Ukraine an AWACS. So this appears to not be on the table.
- I thought Ukraine would most likely end up getting some of the F-16A/Bs that the US has in long-term storage because the US has literally hundreds. Many would take a lot to get into flying condition, but among the numerous ones in storage, I figured at least some might be in condition to send to Ukraine in a few months.
- Ukraine is likely to be offered far more advanced F-16 AM/BMs from the Netherlands and Denmark. Having gone through the Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) process, most importantly the F-16 AM/BMs have far more powerful radars.
The fact that AWACS appears to be off the table is disappointing, as it makes a squadron of F-16s far more potent. In short, F-16s can obtain radar lock data from AWACS to fire long-range missiles via datalink. This makes it so F-16s can fire missiles at targets that are well beyond their radar detection abilities.
If Ukraine had gotten older F-16s with the 1980s/early 90s era radars like the F-16 A/B, those fighters' radars would not be able to detect targets beyond 50-60km, sharply limiting their effective range.
However, the F-16 AM/BMs that Ukraine will receive have gone through the Mid-LIfe Upgrade (MLU), and thus are equipped with the powerful Westinghouse AN/APG-66(V2A) radar. The AN/APG-66(V2A) Radar (an upgrade over the APG-66(V2) on most American MLU F-16s) offers fighter-sized detection ranges of over 110km. This is vastly more powerful than the AN/APG-66(V1) on the F16A/Bs, which only detects fighter sized objects up to 55km.
This means the F-16 AM/BMs Ukraine will receive are also much more powerful than the Phazotron NIIR N019 Radars equipped on the Mig-29s that Ukraine uses, which offer fighter-sized detection ranges of only around 50km.
The avionics (radar detection power) of a fighter are critical in air-to-air combat because the radar determines upon how far a target the fighter can obtain a radar lock. To fire most long-ranged missiles, fighters need to obtain a radar lock first.
So to hit long-distance targets, an aircraft needs both a radar powerful enough to detect the enemy and a missile with the range to hit from that distance.
The Russian weapon that has proven thus far nearly invulnerable has been the Mig-31 Foxhound’s ability to make long-range air-to-air attacks.
The MiG-31 carries a powerful radar that can detect fighter-sized aircraft as far as 200km+. It also has the R-37M air-to-air missile, a large over-the-horizon (OTH) missile that can hit targets as far as 190-200km away.
This long-distance strike capability allows Mig-31 pilots to fly 50-60km behind the front lines, scanning deep into Ukrainian territory for approaching enemy bombers. Ukrainian fighters and bombers can fly at low altitudes to attempt to use radar clutter (interfering objects) to try to avoid detection, but inevitably some Ukrainian aircraft will be detected and fired upon.
Ukrainian pilots have devised a tactic where they use the radar Doppler effect to trick the R-37M missile into missing—by pulling into a rapid vertical climb or a sheer drop, Ukrainian aircraft can rapidly decelerate horizontally, which can help trick the missile.
While this helps Ukrainian fighters and fighter-bombers avoid destruction, these evasive maneuvers generally result in a “soft kill”—where a pilot has to abort his mission to focus on survival and return to base. The Mig-31 may not shoot down the aircraft, but forcing the sortie into a failure is powerful defensively.
And Ukrainian pilots note that if the pilot is caught unaware when an R-37M is fired, just a few seconds' delay in recognizing the danger is most often fatal.
MiG-31 pilots carefully maintain their distance in combat avoiding any chance for Ukrainian MiG-29s to engage them within their 40km combat range, or most Ukrainian anti-air batteries. Thus Ukraine has yet to score a combat kill of a MiG-31 16 months into the war.
The F-16 AM/BM will represent a major upgrade to combat capabilities over MiG-29s due to their advanced avionics (radar), but also the AIM120 AMRAAM missile.
First, the AMRAAM is widely considered to be one of the deadliest mid to long-range air-to-air missiles in the world. It is battle-tested and has one of the highest success rates on deployment of any air-to-air missile.
The missile’s deadliness is partially a function of its advanced electronic systems that help it to overcome enemy jamming or countermeasures, as well as advanced homing characteristics and maneuverability that make enemy evasive maneuvers less likely to succeed.
But the other deadly aspect of the AMRAAM comes from its two-stage radar lock design. Most long-range missiles immediately activate their radar upon firing, and track the target from beginning to end. The disadvantage of this approach is that the radar lock can be detected, warning the pilot of the incoming missile and its location.
The AMRAAM does not activate its radar until it is around midway to its target. The AMRAAM has a datalink with the fighter from which it is fired, drawing radar lock data from the aircraft, thus initially it relies on the information from the fighter’s radar itself. Mid-flight, the missile’s radar activates and the missile homes in on the target using its own radar lock.
While the AMRAAM flies forward without its radar active, it is effectively undetectable. The targeted aircraft’s pilot would only be warned of the incoming missile when the AMRAAM activates its own radar, which effectively cuts the response time to deploy countermeasures or conduct evasive maneuvers in half or less.
Furthermore, the most advanced varieties of the AMRAAM can strike targets at extreme ranges.
Currently, the Ukrainian Air Force relies on the Soviet-era R-73 air-to-air missile, which only offers engagement ranges of 40km.
There are several varieties of AMRAAM missiles. In broad categories, the AMRAAM A/B missiles are considered the standard mid-range missiles, while the AMRAAM C/D missiles are also known as AMRAAM-ER (extended range) and have OTH (over the horizon) range.
- AMRAAM A/B 50km
- AMRAAM C-8 105km
- AMRAAM D-3 160km+
The newest procurement announcement seemed to suggest the possibility Ukraine might be receiving the AMRAAM D-3 through this new contract, although that point remained unclear.
Presently, Ukraine has received deliveries of both the standard AMRAAM A/B missiles, and it has also received AMRAAM C-8 extended-range missiles.
These ranges are based on high-altitude launches by aircraft, so depending on conditions, the ranges can vary. From my understanding, AMRAAM ranges for specific conditions are classified.
However, there are ways we might make an educated guess as to the minimum expected ranges for these missiles. For example, the AMRAAM A/B missiles are the standard ammunition for the ground-launched NASAMS battery. When fired from the ground, the initial speed and altitude are both zero. Under those conditions, the horizontal range of the AMRAAM climbing to strike targets at an altitude of 50.000 feet are around 40km (25 miles), or about a 20% reduction.
Since a speed of zero and altitude of zero are the worst possible conditions from which an AMRAAM can be fired in terms of range, it might be presumed that even when fired from low altitudes at a high altitude target, an AMRAAM should be able to achieve at least 80% of its theoretical range.
There have been efforts to adapt the AMRAAM A/B to the MiG-29, but not the AMRAAM C. The MiG-29 is not well suited to deploy AMRAAM ER (C/D) missiles due to its weak radar system. Since the AMRAAM relies on the fighter’s radar lock for initial guidance, the AMRAAM is limited to the radar detection range of the aircraft from which it is being deployed
Even if the AMRAAM-C has a theoretical range of 100km+, if the Mig-29 can only detect targets 50km away, that’s how far it can fire. Thus the advantages of using an AMRAAM C (105km range) vs an AMRAAM A/B (50km range) may be minimal, if not entirely absent.
it’s still worth adapting the AMRAAM A/B for the MiG-29s, because of the AMRAAM’s deadliness. They are far more adept at puncturing defensive countermeasures than Ukraine’s presently used Soviet-era R-73. But the ARMAAM won’t be enough to make the MiG-29 a serious challenger to the Russian MiG-31’s dominance.
This helps to explain how F-16s may change the air superiority calculus in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
MiG-31s are currently the kings of the battlefield, flying at high altitudes of around 30,000~40,000 feet. The high altitudes make them easy to detect, but it also maximizes the range of their radar detection.
These high-altitude MiG-31 CAP (combat air patrols) make it difficult for Ukrainian fighters or bombers to safely approach any closer than 30-40km from the front lines without considerable risk, even flying at extremely low altitudes to minimize chances of radar detection
An F-16 might change this calculus. Flying at extremely low altitudes to minimize chances of radar detection, the F-16 can creep up towards the front lines. Radar clutter (trees, flights of birds, low clouds, electronic interference) make objects flying low harder to detect, so the F-16 will be able to see the MiG-31 long before the MiG-31 can detect the F-16.
Particularly if the Ukrainian Air Force receives the AMRAAM D-3, it will have a fighting chance on the MiG-31s. Assuming the AMRAAM-D fired from low altitude only achieves 80% of its maximum range, it can presumably strike targets around 130km or more away. Thus, an F-16 approaching within 20-30km of the front lines could strike a target 100km deep into Russian-held territory.
Current MiG-31 patrols usually take place around 50 km deep in Russian territory, but this area would no longer be a safe zone for Russian pilots.
Even if Ukraine is limited to the AMRAAM-C, it has a range of 105km, thus F-16s likely will have a practical combat range of 85-90km. This would allow Ukrainian pilots to strike a high-altitude MiG-31 60-70km deep into Russian territory.
To respond, Russian MiG-31s will either have to accept losses to AMRAAMs, or they will have to move their CAP patrols further back. The greater the distance, the less the chance of radar detection—Ukrainian fighter bombers will be able to conduct bombing missions far more safely.
Furthermore, F-16s would pose a threat to current Russian glide-bomb tactics. Presently, Ukrainian interceptors’ effectiveness is sharply limited by the MiG-31. Not knowing when or where enemy targets would appear, Ukrainian interceptors fly what is called a CAP (combat air patrol) where they fly for extended periods in patrol routes, watching for enemy fighters. Trying to fly close to the front for extended periods would be unreasonably risky. Challenging the MiG-31 is simply not an option given the range disparity.
With the MiG-29s limited to 40km in air-to-air missile combat, so long as Russian fighter-bombers stay even 10-20km from the front, they are relatively safe—this explains their increasing reliance on deploying glide bombs that can be released around 30km from their targets, helping Russians strike targets even 10-20km behind the Ukrainian front lines without fear of interception.
The F-16 could potentially change this dynamic. The F-16’s radar will be limited by the radar horizon (the curvature of the earth) when flying at low altitudes when trying to detect a low-altitude target.
However, a glide bomb achieves its range through the aircraft’s speed and altitude, so the Russian fighter bombers generally climb to several thousand feet in altitude before releasing their weapon. There have not been reports of Russian toss-bombing, where the bomber flies at a low altitude and then climbs sharply to “toss” the bomb at a high angle to increase a glide bomb’s range.
So long as they stay at least 20km behind their lines, Russian bombers can use such tactics without much fear of being intercepted, because they stay out of the range of most Ukrainian SAM (surface-to-air missile) batteries, and Ukrainian CAP are flown too far to make an interception.
With the AMRAAM-ER, F-16s could easily intercept these bombers as they ascend to release the glide bombs.
Russian bombers could respond by reducing their altitude of release for the glide bombs, but unless they quickly master toss-bombing tactics, the range of the glide bombs may be sharply limited—potentially bringing the bombers into engagement ranges of Ukrainian SAM batteries or Mig-29 fighters.
Even if the Russian bombers begin using toss-bombing techniques, they would still face a far greater level of risk than they presently are forced to accept.
An additional piece of importance for the F-16 is its SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense) abilities. The F-16 can unlock the full potential of the AGM-88 HARM missile.
Ukraine first began deploying the HARM missile after Ukrainian engineers worked hard to adapt the HARM missile to Ukraine’s Soviet aircraft, first deploying the missile in August 2022.
The HARM missile is an anti-radiation missile, meaning that it tracks its target by detecting the source of electromagnetic radiation—most commonly radar. It can also be programmed to strike anti-drone GPS jammers or any other kind of electromagnetic radiation. This makes the HARM missile ideal for SEAD missions, as every anti-aircraft missile system has a radar that it relies upon to target enemy aircraft.
However, Ukrainian Soviet era-fighters were not designed with SEAD missions in mind, thus they lack the sensors to detect and target enemy surface radar or other electromagnetic radiation, or to communicate that information to the HARM missile.
Thus, Ukrainian fighters are carrying HARM missiles that are in “pre-programmed” modes of fire. That is, the coordinates of the target are programmed into the missiles before the aircraft takes off.
The pre-programmed mode has two major drawbacks.
First, the Ukrainian pilots have no way to know if the radar or jammer has been turned off when they fire. They take off, fire at their target, and hope that the target has not moved, or turned off its radar. if either is the case, the HARM missile will likely be wasted.
Second, Ukrainian pilots cannot “go hunting.” Since they lack the sensors to detect enemy radar or GPS jammers, they must wait for the coordinates of such a target, then board their jets.
An F-16 can unlock the full combat potential of the HARM missile. The F-16 AM/BM’s sensor array can detect enemy radar and GPS jammers from 150km away. The HARM missile’s range (160km) means that Ukrainian pilots can safely fly 40-50km behind friendly lines, waiting for a Russian SAM battery or GPS jammer to turn on. The moment that electromagnetic radiation is spotted, the F-16 can program the coordinates into the HARM missile, and a missile could be on its way to the target within seconds.
These types of SEAD patrols can frighten Russian SAM battery and GPS jammer crews into not using their equipment at all. During the Iraq War, Iraqi SAM battery crews quickly learned that turning on their radars meant death, and Iraqi air defenses all but disappeared. It’s unlikely that Ukraine can achieve that level of dominance, but it gives an idea of how deadly the HARM missile can be at its full potential.
Lastly, the F-16 can be equipped with AN/AAQ-33 Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod (Sniper ATP) targeting pods.
When striking ground targets, modern aircraft rely predominantly on GPS or laser-guided munitions.
GPS munitions, like the JDAM glide bomb, the Storm Shadow cruise missile, or the HIMARS GMRLS rocket, are invaluable in part because they need very little beyond a target coordinate to strike accurately. Once fired, the bomb or missile needs no further input from the aircraft, which can turn around and disengage if it wishes.
The disadvantage of GPS weapons is that they are mostly only useful for striking fixed targets. Because the munition is attacking a coordinate, it will not adjust its trajectory if the target moves. This is fine if the target is a bridge, a command HQ, a warehouse full of munitions, or a fuel depot. But it is not effective against vehicles or other moving targets.
Laser-guided munitions are the weapon of choice for such targets. For example, the U.S. Air Force uses the GBU-24 Paveway III laser-guided bomb or the AGM-114 Hellfire antitank missile to target and destroy enemy armored vehicles. Laser guidance allows the pilot to guide the munition to the moving target, making strikes on moving targets possible.
However, this is nearly impossible for the Ukrainian Air Force at present—Ukrainian bombers like the Su-24 must manually guide laser-guided munitions onto their targets. it is difficult to take any evasive maneuvers during this process or the laser guidance is likely to be broken. The bomber also needs to be within a few km of the target, which is far too dangerous for most Ukrainian aircraft at present.
The F-16 Sniper ATP automates much of this process. The Sniper ATP is a type of “targeting pod,” a digital camera and laser guidance system that links to F-16 pilots’ JHMCS helmet-mounted targeting systems. The Sniper ATP analyzes surface image data and identifies friendly and enemy targets from as much as 74km away.
Furthermore, the Sniper ATP automates laser guidance, requiring no more than target identification through a look-and-fire system. The pilot needs only stare at the target and pull the trigger, and Sniper ATP takes over further laser guidance. The pilot can focus on enemy threats or evasive maneuvers.
Soviet and Russian aircraft lagged behind in the development of targeting pods, and this has remained a major reason for the ineffectiveness of Russian air strikes, particularly on moving targets.
For example, if Ukraine were to receive some Hellfire antitank missiles with the F-16s, it would give Ukrainian pilots the ability to strike enemy tanks from 11km away, Combined with the SEAD abilities of the F-16, and the F-16’s air-to-air combat power that may push Russian CAP missions further behind Russian lines, this may create an opening for ground attack F-16s to strike Russian armored formations.
At present, it’s not clear if Ukraine will receive Hellfire missiles or Sniper ATPs. Ukraine has already received the HARM missile and the AMRAAM-C, but it’s not clear if it will receive the AMRAAM-D missile.
Even just using the HARM missile and the AMRAAM-C, the F-16s will represent a major upgrade over existing Ukrainian aerial capabilities. However, adding the AMRAAM-D, Hellfire Missiles, and the Sniper ATP will help to maximize the combat power of the F-16.
There is an expectation that Ukrainian pilots may begin finishing their training for the F-16 around late September to early October 2023. Ukraine is expected to receive around 50 F-16 AM/BMs from the Netherlands and Denmark at that time. Ukraine often operates its fighters in squadrons of 12 aircraft, so this should be enough to form four Ukrainian squadrons, which was assessed as the minimum number to operate on a single 150km front—about the size of the Southern (Tokmak/Velyka Novosilka) offensive.
I hope that Ukraine’s allies step up to provide the full weaponry necessary to maximize the F-16’s potential.
One last note—I’ll be doing some of the official Ukraine Updates for about two weeks starting on Saturday while Kos is on vacation. My first article is coming out on Saturday, June 24th!
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